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Research summary: This research examines the role
played by home and host country learning in the rela-
tionship between the speed of institutional change and
subsidiary performance. We posit a negative relation-
ship between the speed of institutional change in the
host country and subsidiary performance. We also
argue that this relationship is contingent on the institu-
tional learning that parent multinationals (MNEs) have
previously attained in other countries. By integrating
the dynamic institution-based view and the organiza-
tional learning literature, our analysis highlights the
key role that abilities and skills developed by MNEs to
face rapid institutional changes have on the host coun-
tries in which they operate. We test our theoretical
model using a sample of 342 subsidiaries from 68 MNEs
operating in emerging and developed economies during
2001–2017.
Managerial summary: MNEs regularly face institu-
tional changes in both home and host countries. How-
ever, institutions evolve at different speeds. According
to previous studies, the performance of subsidiaries is
threatened when institutional changes happen quickly.
MNEs need to develop the ability to help their
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subsidiaries face changes immediately and with no loss
of performance. Our research shows that MNEs can
learn from prior rapid institutional changes in the
home and host countries and transfer this knowledge
to their subsidiaries so that they can be more equipped
to deal with it in the future.
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dynamic institution-based view, home country learning, host
country learning, institutional advantage, speed of institutional
change
1 | INTRODUCTION
The effect of pro-market institutions on firm performance has been widely studied in the aca-
demic literature (Chari & Banalieva, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Cuervo-Cazurra,
Gaur, & Singh, 2019; Dau, 2013). Nevertheless, recent studies focus not only on the level of pro-
market institutions but also on the speed of their change as key determinants of firm decisions
and performance (Banalieva, Cuervo-Cazurra, & Sarathy, 2018; Banalieva, Eddleston, &
Zellweger, 2015). The underlying argument is that the influence of the velocity of institutional
change on firms' strategies and performance depends on firms' capabilities to rapidly adapt to
changes (Kim, Kim, & Hoskisson, 2010; Putzhammer, Slangen, Puck, & Lindner, 2020). Within
this context, the dynamic institution-based view emerges as a research stream that emphasizes
the dynamic nature of these institutions (Banalieva et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2010; Xu &
Meyer, 2013).
What are the factors that influence the capabilities of firms to rapidly respond to sudden
changes in pro-market institutions? Recent studies have delved into this key research question by
demonstrating that certain firms have been able to develop higher flexibility and adaptation skills,
such as non-family firms (Banalieva et al., 2015) and efficient firms (Banalieva et al., 2018).
Although these skills depend on firms' strategy and characteristics, can firms learn to rapidly adapt
to rapid institutional changes? According to organizational learning theory, firms benefit from pre-
vious experience since it helps them to more rapidly detect opportunities and respond to chal-
lenges (e.g., Figueiredo & Cohen, 2019; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). In the international business
(IB) context, multinational enterprises (MNEs) gain experience in the home and host countries in
which they operate, thus developing skills and competencies that help them to gain competitive
advantages in their international activities (Hsu & Pereira, 2008). Previous organizational learning
studies have adopted a static perspective of the institutional environment, simply by focusing on
the existence of similarities between home and host countries' institutional conditions
(e.g., Chang, 1995; Delios & Beamish, 2001; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). By integrating organiza-
tional learning theory and the dynamic institution-based view, we aim to demonstrate that MNEs
can learn to better manage the consequences of rapid changes in institutional conditions when
they have experienced fast institutional changes in the home and host countries. This experience
becomes a strategic resource that confers MNEs' subsidiaries with higher flexibility and adaptation
capabilities that result in institutional competitive advantages (Martin, 2014). To have a complete
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vision of how institutional dynamism affects subsidiaries' performance, it is necessary to take into
account the institutional learning that MNEs have experienced in other contexts because it influ-
ences the adaptation capabilities of firms.
Accordingly, the objective of this study is to analyze the moderating effect of the experience
in dealing with fast institutional changes in the home and host countries of MNEs on the rela-
tionship between the speed of institutional change and subsidiary performance. We would
expect a negative relationship between the speed of changes in pro-market institutions and sub-
sidiary performance; however, not all firms adapt to these changes in the same way (Banalieva
et al., 2015). Our reasoning behind this expectation is that subsidiaries of MNEs that have previ-
ously experienced fast institutional changes in their home and host markets can exploit this
institutional learning to better adapt to subsequent rapid institutional changes. MNEs should
be aware of this moderating effect to decide to enter markets experiencing fast pro-market
reforms, where they can be in an advantageous position, as well as to introduce internal policies
that favor the storage and the transfer of knowledge between subsidiaries. We test our hypothe-
ses on the worldwide mobile telecommunications industry. This industry is especially appropri-
ate for our analysis because it has experienced important internationalization during the past
decades. Furthermore, our sample includes MNEs that are competing globally, with a presence
in the five continents, including both emerging and advanced economies that have experienced
institutional changes at different velocities.
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge, this article is the
first attempt to integrate organizational learning and dynamic institution-based view literatures in
analyzing subsidiary performance. We respond to the call to more deeply examine the relationship
between institutional changes and firm performance by considering learning from host and home
countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, Gaur, & Singh, 2019). We incorporate the organizational learning liter-
ature on the dynamic institution-based view by moving the focus from the institutional differences
between the home and host countries (as a key obstacle to transfer experience from one country to
another) to the experiential learning of fast institutional changes (as a key resource to build adap-
tation capabilities that diminish the negative impact of rapid institutional changes). We differenti-
ate between the learning that comes from the home country and host countries since the extant
literature has considered them to be two different sources of experience that condition the interna-
tionalization process and outcomes (Zhou & Guillén, 2015). Second, we provide additional empiri-
cal support for the dynamic institution-based view of the strategy in a wider sample of countries.
Our study aims to provide new evidence about the relationship between the speed of institutional
change and firm performance in the context of MNEs' activity. In this vein, we analyze the impact
that the speed of institutional change in the host country where MNEs develop their activity has
on subsidiary performance. However, while prior studies have mainly focused on emerging econo-
mies (Banalieva et al., 2018) or subnational regions (Banalieva et al., 2015), we use a sample that
includes 342 subsidiaries from 68 MNEs located in 34 developed and 108 emerging economies for
a long-time window (2001–2017).
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 | The dynamic institution-based view of strategy
The institution-based view of strategy argues that the institutional environment where compa-
nies compete, the “rules of the game” (North, 1990), influences firms' choices by restricting or
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facilitating their activity (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). Insti-
tutions provide stability for economic exchanges by reducing uncertainty (North, 1990). Previ-
ous research has studied how the institutions in a country constitute a crucial factor that
influences both the strategic decisions of firms and their performance (Ang, Benischke, &
Doh, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra, Mudambi, & Pedersen, 2019; Dikova & Brouthers, 2016; Her-
nandez, Nieto, & Boellis, 2018; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Among these institutions, scholars
have devoted special attention to pro-market institutions, that is, “rules and regulations that
facilitate market transactions and limit the role of the government in the economy” (Cuervo-
Cazurra, Gaur, & Singh, 2019, p. 598), such as the existence of efficient financial intermediaries,
judicial systems, and property right protection.
The rules of the game change over time (Peng, 2003). Countries usually implement institu-
tional changes with the aim of liberalizing the market. These changes are usually known as
pro-market reforms (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000;
Newman, 2000; Park, Li, & Tse, 2006; Peng, 2003).1 According to Dau (2012), pro-market
reforms lead to national governance improvements and economic liberalization. First, govern-
ments try to reduce market imperfections through improvements in laws and regulations, pub-
lic goods, and infrastructures. For instance, governments increase labor flexibility by reducing
restrictions on termination of employment (Botero, Djankov, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, &
Shleifer, 2004), encourage innovation by improving property rights protection (Chen &
Puttitanun, 2005), and reduce uncertainty by facilitating the process of enforcing contracts in
courts (North, 1991). Second, economic liberalization minimizes the government intervention
in economic activities, with the government becoming a facilitator instead of an active partici-
pant. For this reason, pro-market reforms usually bring price liberalization and a reduction of
industry and trade barriers in a country, which favors competition, innovation, and the entry
of foreign investors (Dau, 2012).
Despite the above arguments, previous empirical studies show inconclusive evidence about
the effect that pro-market reforms have on firm performance (Banalieva et al., 2018; Cuervo-
Cazurra, Mudambi, & Pedersen, 2019). Some studies that focus on emerging environments
report that pro-market reforms lead to better performance (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Park
et al., 2006), while others fail to find such positive effects (Lee, Peng, & Lee, 2008; Salim, 2003).
More recent studies report a U-shaped relationship between institutional reforms and firm per-
formance (Chari & Banalieva, 2015). Given the absence of consensus, some studies have tried
to provide a more complete explanation by incorporating a dynamic approach to the concept of
institutional change. Previous research had considered institutional change as a static event
only focusing on the analysis of the scope of the institutional change. However, pro-market
reforms take time and are not developed in one step (Banalieva et al., 2015). These reforms can
be carried out gradually over a long period of time or they can be rapidly developed (Chen, Cui,
Li, & Rolfe, 2017). The dynamic institution-based view of strategy arises to focus on the effect
that the speed of institutional changes has on firm choices and performance (Banalieva
et al., 2015).
According to this perspective, an institutional change implies a multi-stage process in which
each stage derives from different institutional environments and institutional logics
(Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Hoffman, 1999; Peng, 2003) and the transition from
one stage to the next can vary in its velocity. Governments can employ the fast introduction of
reforms to show a potential position (Huang, 2013; Walsh, 2007) and, with the aim of increasing
efficiency in the market, to show the commitment of the government to market liberalization,
and to try to reduce transaction costs (Banalieva et al., 2018). Nevertheless, other governments,
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which have already undergone a period of intensive pro-market reforms, can implement these
reforms more slowly due to pressures from stakeholders, or because of a change of government
mandate (Rajan & Zingales, 2003). From the dynamic institution-based view, the institutional
change is not as important as the speed at which this change takes place (Banalieva
et al., 2015), which can influence firm performance by creating an unstable environment. As
posited by Banalieva et al. (2015), the notion of speed refers both to the change in the level of
development of market-supporting institutions (distance traveled) and to the time needed to
develop this change (time duration). In this way, this construct complements the static view of
the change used in prior studies, which focus only on the final result of the pro-market reforms,
and adopts a dynamic perspective that also takes into consideration how quickly the result has
been achieved.
2.2 | Home and host country learning and institutional advantages
Firms are heterogeneous in their ability to interact with the institutional environment (Chen
et al., 2017), and they do not respond in the same way to institutional changes (Oliver, 1991). Some
firms have resources that lead to a better adaptation (Chari & Banalieva, 2015; Kim et al., 2010;
Xu & Meyer, 2013), thus conferring them with an institutional competitive advantage. According
to Martin (2014, p. 59), a firm has an institutional competitive advantage when it “is implementing
a strategy, featuring distinctive resources and activities enabled by its interactions with the institu-
tional environment, which generates economic value in excess of its competitors.”
When institutional changes take place, firms will be forced to de-institutionalize norms,
beliefs, and practices previously legitimized to adapt to the new rules of the game. They need to
improve resources, capabilities, productivity, and efficiency in the allocation of resources to sur-
vive as a consequence of these reforms (Oliver, 1992). The literature has shown that firms gen-
erate new resources and capabilities through learning and experience curves.
Experience is a prime source of learning in organizations (Huber, 1991). The organizational
learning literature has noted that firms learn by interpreting relevant knowledge derived from
their experience within a specific domain (Levitt & March, 1988). The experiential learning that
companies gain facing environmental changes allows them to better react and adapt to similar
changes in the future (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). As a rapid institutional change represents a
challenge to subsidiaries that need to quickly adapt to the new rules, those subsidiaries that
belong to a parent company that have previously experienced rapid institutional changes will
benefit from this learning. In the context of IB, previous studies have focused on two types of
contexts that provide experience to MNEs and that will shape their decisions and outcomes,
namely the home country and the host countries (Zhou & Guillén, 2015).
First, a vital learning source for MNEs is the country in which the firm is based (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2011; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). The influence of the home country on MNEs' decisions
is one of the key topics that the IB literature has analyzed in recent years (Banalieva
et al., 2018; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Lee & Weng, 2013; Ramamurti, 2012). The home country
determines the MNEs' structure and strategy with persisting effects over time (Kimberly, 1979;
Schein, 1983), influencing MNEs' decisions when expanding abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006;
Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Perkins, 2014). Cuervo-Cazurra, Luo, Ramamurti, and Ang (2018) ref-
erences home country institutional learning as the experience gained in the home country in
dealing with the peculiarities of that country's institutions. Our assumption is that MNEs that
have previous experience in dealing with rapid institutional changes in their home markets will
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have learned to quickly adapt to rapid pro-market reforms in their host markets and gain an
institutional advantage.
Second, MNEs also obtain learning from the experiences they have had in internationalized
host markets (Hsu & Pereira, 2008). Experiential learning studies in the IB literature posit that
learning-curve effects appear as firms increase their international expansion experience
(Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996). As MNEs grow and experience changing institutional condi-
tions in their host markets, they learn to adapt to subsequent changing environments, even if
they have not experienced these fast institutional changes in their home countries. According
to Zhou and Guillén (2015, p. 908), “as MNEs gain experience over time, their strategies and
structures will be increasingly influenced by the characteristics of other countries in which they
operate in addition to the home country”.
3 | HYPOTHESES
3.1 | Speed of pro-market institutions change and subsidiary
performance in the host country
As the institutional framework in which firms are immersed is complex and constantly chang-
ing (Peng, 2003), the ability of firms to deal with its drastic alterations becomes a determinant
of firm competitive advantage (D'Aveni, 1994). This ability is dependent on the speed of pro-
market reforms (Banalieva et al., 2015). Gradual institutional change in the host country allows
firms to adjust with minimum stress (Godoy & Stiglitz, 2007; Murrell, 1992), but when changes
happen quickly, uncertainty increases, and making decisions becomes a complex task (Chari &
Banalieva, 2015).
In this vein, scholars have noted that the value of firms tends to decrease as pro-market
institutions rapidly evolve toward a market economy because of the adaptation costs to the new
context (Banalieva et al., 2015). The government eliminates its role in establishing production
and sales goals, and the subsidiaries must quickly learn to implement production objectives,
establish prices that maximize profits, and seek new customers (Hurt, Hurt-Warski, & Roux-
Dufort, 2000). This new competitive landscape usually is characterized by a sudden increase in
the level of competition from new local and foreign entrants, a subsequent drastic drop
in prices, and the implementation of innovations that can even make obsolete subsidiaries'
technologies and products. First, rapid reforms in market-supporting institutions quickly elimi-
nate transactional barriers in the economy, which suddenly opens up more market space for
other firms that enhances growing market opportunities for local and foreign participants, lead-
ing to even greater competition (Chen et al., 2017; Havrylyshyn, 2007). This drastic increase in
the level of competition in the market makes it difficult to predict the demand evolution and to
allocate the necessary resources to satisfy it (Illner, 1998; Xu & Meyer, 2013).
Second, as competition increases, established subsidiaries must face ambitious customer
expectations and compete with sophisticated products from new competitors (Chari &
David, 2012). Customers will compare product characteristics, and they will demand a greater
supply and wait for new and better products derived from rivals' innovations that can even
shorten the life cycles of existing subsidiary products (Illner, 1998). To respond to customer
expectations and attract customers, subsidiaries should invest in improving the characteristics
of their products, search for new suppliers, and even drop prices to be more competitive, which
will have a negative impact on profitability.
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Moreover, MNEs' subsidiaries may even be in a disadvantageous position in comparison to
local competitors in case of rapid institutional changes, as foreign entrants often lack the non-
market resources (e.g., informal ties with local authorities, suppliers, customers, and policy
makers) that act as a key source of information (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011; Henisz &
Zelner, 2012; Zaheer, 1995) and can serve to anticipate the consequences of rapid institutional
changes. Therefore, as a result of rapid pro-market reforms, the competition from local competi-
tors can also threaten the performance and even survival of subsidiaries.
Subsequently, the uncertainty and volatility associated with rapid pro-market institutions
make it difficult for subsidiaries to accurately predict the key parameters of their strategic
decision-making process to counteract the new environment (Park et al., 2006; Xu &
Meyer, 2013). This deficiency of adaptation will require that subsidiaries invest resources to
develop new capabilities and skills, sometimes through trial and error (Hoskisson et al., 2000;
Ireland, Tihanyi, & Webb, 2008), which will negatively affect subsidiary performance. From
here, our first hypothesis is derived:
Hypothesis 1. (H1). A high speed of institutional change in the host country nega-
tively affects subsidiary performance.
3.2 | MNEs and institutional learning in the home country
In the context of strategy and IB, the importance of knowledge for MNEs, as well as their ability
to create and share it, has been widely recognized (Gaur, Ma, & Ge, 2019). Previous literature
has observed that MNEs possess superior knowledge that confers them competitive advantages
that can be exploited abroad (Kogut & Zander, 1993) and that can help foreign subsidiaries to
face unfamiliar environments (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Caves, 1971). As previously mentioned,
an important source of learning for MNEs is the home country (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Cuervo-
Cazurra et al., 2018) because they have developed the capabilities and skills to face the particu-
larities of these environments.
Some MNEs are based in countries that have been subject to institutional changes. Specifi-
cally, recent studies have shown that certain MNEs (e.g., multinationals from emerging econo-
mies) possess specific capabilities that allow them to better adapt to turbulent environments
(De Beule, Elia, & Piscitello, 2014; Guillén & García-Canal, 2009). The main reason is that they
have obtained valuable institutional learning in their home countries that can be used in the
internationalization process. As a consequence of their exposure to unstable institutional envi-
ronments in their country of origin, some MNEs develop adaptive management skills that allow
them to react with greater flexibility abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2017). For
instance, Del Sol and Kogan (2007) demonstrate that the knowledge acquired during the 1990s
in the electricity and pension industries due to the economic liberalization in Chile was trans-
ferrable to other industries and also to other Latin American countries undergoing pro-market
reforms 10 years later. Thus, being based in a country that has experienced drastic pro-market
reforms does not necessarily mean a source of a disadvantage, but rather an advantage as it pro-
vides MNEs with adaptive capabilities to confront threats and exploit the opportunities that
arise from rapid institutional changes in other host countries.
In this vein, when the institutional changes that MNEs face in their home countries take
place in a short time period, they have to deploy greater adaptive capabilities to be competitive
and survive. As a consequence of the learning developed at home, these MNEs can better
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identify the intentions of governments in host markets when they try to improve market-
supporting institutions and will react quicker than other less experienced firms (Henisz &
Delios, 2000). As a result, MNEs based in countries that have experienced a quick institutional
change can develop better strategies in the host country.
Consequently, we expect that the subsidiaries that are controlled by these MNEs with origins in
countries undergoing a high speed of institutional change can benefit from the MNEs learning
when rapid institutional changes take place in the host market. These subsidiaries will have the
capacity to react to institutional changes faster, so they will not suffer the high costs associated with
the adaptation process. This confers them an institutional advantage since the negative effect of
rapid institutional changes on their performance is expected to weaken. Therefore, we propose that:
Hypothesis 2. (H2). MNEs' past home country learning in response to rapid institu-
tional changes positively moderates the negative relationship between the speed of insti-
tutional change in the host country and subsidiary performance.
3.3 | MNEs and institutional learning in other host countries
As discussed, previous research has shown that experience is a key element that may allow firms to
obtain competitive advantages. Subsidiaries can benefit from resources and capabilities that parent
MNEs have generated in their home countries (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Shaver, Mitchell, &
Yeung, 1997; Tallman & Yip, 2001), but can also benefit from capabilities that other subsidiaries have
developed in host countries in which the MNEs operate (Perkins, 2014; Zhou & Guillén, 2015).
Internationalization can be seen as a process of learning and knowledge development
(Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). Previous literature has also shown that MNEs can gain
institutional learning by interacting with different environments through their subsidiaries
(Perkins, 2014; Powell & Rhee, 2016). Some authors such as Perkins (2014) have identified that
firms can generate institutional capabilities that allow them to obtain better results in other units.
As companies grow and face changing institutional environments, they learn to adapt to such situ-
ations (Kraatz, 1998; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). When subsidiaries operate under rapid institu-
tional changes, they face sudden increases in new competitors, variations in consumer preferences
(McMillan & Woodruff, 2002), adaptation costs associated with new regulations (Chari &
Banalieva, 2015), and political instability. As a result, they need to develop skills and abilities to
survive in this situation; adapting to changing environments will generate learning, which may
become a source of institutional competitive advantage (Martin, 2014) when another subsidiary
undergoes rapid institutional changes (Perkins, 2014) and other sub-units can take advantage of it.
Given that one of the key advantages for MNEs is their ability to obtain knowledge by learn-
ing in different environments and redistribute that knowledge in subsequent operations
(Mu, Gnyawali, & Hatfield, 2007; Powell & Rhee, 2016), as MNEs acquire greater institutional
learning, the greater the transfer of knowledge to their subsidiaries (Mu et al., 2007; Zhou &
Guillén, 2015). When rapid changes in market-supporting institutions in a host country take
place, attributes such as efficiency, flexibility, and rapid adaptation will be crucial for subsidi-
aries (McMillan & Woodruff, 2002). Therefore, the more learning in response to rapid institu-
tional changes an MNE has accumulated in other host countries, the greater the institutional
competitive advantage generated, and the greater the adaptation and flexibility tools, skills, and
capabilities that can be used by other subsidiaries when faced with a similar situation of institu-
tional change. Therefore, we propose that:
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Hypothesis 3. (H3). MNEs' past host countries learning in response to rapid institu-
tional changes positively moderates the negative relationship between the speed of insti-
tutional change in the host country and subsidiary performance.
4 | SAMPLE, VARIABLES, AND METHODS
4.1 | The mobile telecommunications industry
The empirical analysis is carried out in the mobile telecommunications industry. Our data come
from the GSMA Intelligence Database (GSMA Intelligence, 2018). GSMA Intelligence is a source
of mobile operator data, analysis, and forecasts. With more than 26 million individual data points
(updated daily), the service provides coverage of the performance of more than 1,400 operators
and 1,200 mobile virtual network operators across more than 4,400 networks, 80 groups, and
237 countries and territories worldwide (GSMA Intelligence, 2018). With data retrieved from this
data set, we have built a panel of 3,963 observations that correspond to the yearly performance
obtained by 342 subsidiaries2 (our unit of analysis) in 142 host countries from 2001 to 2017. These
subsidiaries belong to 68 MNEs from 44 home countries.3 The data set also provides information
about several variables regarding the subsidiary, such as age and size, to complement the analysis.
This industry is especially suitable for our research for several reasons. First, the mobile tele-
communications industry has recently undergone an exponential internationalization process,
during which time MNEs have become the key players in the industry. Moreover, these MNEs
carry out their activity over five continents, which favors our research purposes because it intro-
duces high institutional variability across host countries where subsidiaries compete.
Second, it is true that internationalization in the industry started with FDI by MNEs from
advanced economies (e.g., Deutsche Telekom from Germany, Orange from France, Telefonica
from Spain, and Vodafone from the United Kingdom); however, during the last 20 years, MNEs
from emerging economies have gained leading positions in the industry (e.g., América Movil
from Mexico, Bharti Airtel from India, and Zain from Kuwait). As a consequence, the 68 MNEs
included in our sample come from 44 home countries—51% from countries with emerging
economies and 49% from countries with advanced economies. This distribution of home coun-
tries is adequate for testing to what extent the experience under rapid institutional changes in
the home country of the MNEs could be a source of institutional learning to counteract the
speed of pro-market institutions on the performance of the subsidiary.
Finally, as mentioned previously, mobile telecommunications is an industry that has under-
gone a wide internationalization process, where MNEs can be found in most of the countries.
This geographic diversity makes this sector suitable for analyzing prior learning in different
host institutional settings that have undergone rapid changes and that can give subsidiaries an
institutional competitive advantage to better adapt to pro-market institutions.
4.2 | Dependent variable
Following previous studies in the mobile telecommunications industry (Domínguez, Garrido, &
Orcos, 2016; Jakopin & Klein, 2012; Sung, 2014), we use the EBITDA margin as a measure of
subsidiary performance.4 The EBITDA margin retrieved from GSMA intelligence data set is a
ratio where the numerator is the total EBITDA obtained by the subsidiary (total operating profit
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in the period before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization) and the denominator is the
total revenue.
4.3 | Independent variables
4.3.1 | Speed of institutional change in the host country (host institutional
change speed)
To approach our main independent variable, we follow the measure proposed by Banalieva
et al. (2015), which has been lately used for similar purposes (Chen et al., 2017) and departs
from the scope of pro-market institutions in a base year. The speed of institutional change cap-
tures the difference between the scope of pro-market institutions from the base year to the cur-
rent year (distance traveled) and the number of years elapsed to achieve the reform (time
duration). Accordingly, as our sample covers the period 2001–2017, we first calculated the scope
of pro-market institutions for each country and year from 2000 (the base year) to 2017. We use
the Economic Freedom Index (EFI), developed by the Heritage Foundation, and which has
been widely used in previous studies (Fuentelsaz, Garrido, & Maicas, 2015a; Meyer, Estrin,
Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). The EFI documents the positive relationship between economic free-
dom and a variety of positive social and economic goals. The index measures economic freedom
based on 12 factors, that are grouped into four categories or broad pillars of economic
freedom such as rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency, and open markets. Each of
the 12 items is measured on a scale from 0 to 100 (total freedom). Following Meyer et al. (2009),
we have calculated the mean value of the five categories that most closely reflect the efficiency
of the markets and that have previously served to operationalize market-supporting institutions:
business freedom, trade freedom, property rights, investment freedom, and financial freedom
(Meyer et al., 2009). In this way, we measure the extent to which institutions in a market sup-
port economic exchanges by ensuring capital and information flows, the protection of property
rights, and the entry of new participants into a market (Fuentelsaz et al., 2015a).
Second, we followed the measure proposed by Banalieva et al. (2015) as:
Speed of institutional changei,t ¼
Actual Speed of Institutional Changei,t
Fastest Speed of Institutional Changei
The Actual Speed of Institutional Change in a host country i is defined as the difference between
the scope of market-supporting institutions in the year t (t = 2001–2017) and the scope of market-
supporting institutions in the base year (2000)5 (distance traveled) divided by the number of years
elapsed from 2000 (time duration).6 Thus, when comparing two countries, the country with faster
institutional changes will be the one that, for a similar period of time, has carried out more pro-
market reforms (higher numerator), or the one that, for a similar institutional change, has needed
less time (lower denominator). However, it is necessary to consider that, in some countries, the
subsequent speed of institutional change may be slower not because reforms are developing gradu-
ally, but because the chance to improve pro-market institutions is small, as the scope of pro-market
institutions in the base year was already high. Accordingly, the measure of Banalieva et al. (2015)
considers that the actual speed of institutional change is relative to its Fastest Speed of Institutional
Changei, which captures the maximum institutional change that can take place in a country i from
the base year (Heybey & Murrell, 1999). In our case, the fastest speed of institutional change is
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calculated as the difference between 100 (the maximum scope of the Economic Freedom Index)
and the scope of institutions for each country in 2000.
Accordingly, a higher value of the variable Speed of institutional change indicates a faster
velocity of institutional change (Banalieva et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2017). With this measure, we
consider that pro-market reforms will be faster if more institutional changes are achieved in less
time, which abandons the static concept of institutional change by incorporating the impor-
tance of the time needed to achieve that change. Furthermore, given that we understand that
there are countries that are in different institutional starting points in the base year, our vari-
able takes into account the maximum level of change that could take place from that period.
4.3.2 | Home country learning
Because the objective of this study is to analyze how the prior institutional learning developed
by MNEs can help subsidiaries to face the speed of host institutional change and because previ-
ous studies show the influence of time on learning (Zhou & Guillén, 2015), we calculate an
accumulated experience variable. To do so, we carry out a cumulative sum of the number of
periods in which the MNEs have undergone rapid institutional change conditions in the home
country. We consider that the home country is under a rapid institutional change in a period t
if its speed of change during that period is above the mean + 1 SD of all the countries included
in the sample. Taking this into account, for each period of time t, we calculate our variable as
follows:
Home country learningt ¼
Xt
t¼2001
Periods under rapid changest
where t = 2001–2017. The more periods the parent MNE has been under rapid institutional
change, the greater this prior learning will be.
4.3.3 | Host countries learning
Similar to the previous measure, to calculate this prior learning we have generated a variable of
accumulated experience that considers the importance of time on learning (Zhou &
Guillén, 2015). To calculate our variable, we carry out a cumulative sum of the number of host
countries and periods under rapid institutional change conditions in which the MNEs were pre-
sent. First, for each period t, we calculate the number of countries that have undergone rapid
institutional change where the MNE have a subsidiary (Number of countries under rapid
changes). We consider that a host country is under a rapid institutional change in a period t if
its speed of change during that period is above the mean + 1 SD of all the countries included in
the sample. Subsequently, we calculate a cumulative sum over time of all the countries
in which it has a presence for each moment of time. That is, for each MNE j in period t, the var-
iable is calculated as follows:
Host countries learningj,t ¼
Xt
t¼2001
Number of countries under rapid changest
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where t = 2001–2017. This variable will take on a greater value the more host countries and the
longer an MNE has undergone rapid institutional change through other subsidiaries.
4.4 | Control variables
First, we control for subsidiary-level influences on performance. Older firms may be more prof-
itable, as they are more established in the market and can obtain first-mover advantages
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). Thus, similarly to previous studies, we control for subsidiary
age through the number of years since foundation (Banalieva et al., 2018). Moreover,
subsidiary size generally has a positive effect on performance because large firms can have more
favorable access to capital and more efficient resources and can enjoy higher efficiency due to
scale economies (Park et al., 2006). We measure subsidiary size by the number of millions of
connections of each operator.7
Second, we control the effect of MNE-level variables because parent resources and capabili-
ties can affect the subsidiary performance. Given that the size of the firm is related to resource
endowments (Audia & Greve, 2006), we measure the MNE size with the natural logarithm of
the worldwide number of connections of the MNE (calculated as the sum of the number of con-
nections of MNEs' subsidiaries of total connections) (Fuentelsaz, Garrido, & Maicas, 2020).
Also, older MNEs may have access to more resources, as they are more established in the mar-
ket, so we control for MNE age with the number of years since foundation (Banalieva
et al., 2018). We also control for the accumulated number of countries other than the home
country where the parent company is present to proxy the MNE experience. Finally, because the
control that the MNEs have over the subsidiary can influence the knowledge transfer between
the parent company and the subsidiary, we also control for the level of ownership that the
MNE held over the subsidiary (MNE ownership level).
Third, we include home and host country-level control variables. Similar to previous studies
(Banalieva et al., 2015; Banalieva et al., 2018), we control for the scope of host institutions. This vari-
able is calculated as the average of the five dimensions of the Economic Freedom Index for country
i in period t. When a host country has stronger market-supporting institutions, we can expect a
higher level of competition and lower performance. We also include the scope of home institutions
where we calculate it similarly to the previous measure but focusing on the home economies.
Moreover, because the institutional changes happen at different institutional levels, we include a
variable to control for the institutional starting point. A dummy variable is incorporated that takes
a value of 1 if the host country of the subsidiary was in a situation of moderate economic freedom
in our base year and 0 otherwise.8 Because a larger market may give more opportunities to subsidi-
aries, we control by country size (in millions of habitants) and country GDP (in thousands of mil-
lions of euros). Moreover, when a technological change happens, industry leaders may see their
first-mover advantages weakened and new market segments may emerge with new opportunities
to generate profits. So we control for the existence of a technological change in the market through
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 since the period that the 3G technology appeared in the
market, and 0 in the previous years. Also, we include the host market concentration because we
expect that more competitive markets show a lower performance (Gomez & Maícas, 2011). We
employ the HHI previously mentioned, provided by the GSMA database. Similarly, we control for
home market concentration. Moreover, given that the increase in demand can induce the entry of
new competitors in the market, affecting the performance of the subsidiary, we control for demand
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growth (Park et al., 2006). Finally, the model includes region and year dummies to control for
regional and time-specific influences, respectively.
Because the effects of independent variables on performance may not necessarily material-
ize immediately, we consider a 1-year lag between EBITDA margin and the independent and
control variables (Kim et al., 2010; Lu & Beamish, 2004; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003).
4.5 | Descriptive analysis
As the study focuses on the speed of institutional change in the host country, we find it impor-
tant to determine to what extent pro-market institutions have taken place in our sample. For
this reason, Table 1 show the evolution of pro-market institutions in the host countries included
in our sample, while Tables 2 and 3 show the descriptive statistics and correlations for all the
variables included in our analysis.
Table 1 presents the average value of the five dimensions of the Economic Freedom Index
in 2000 and 2017 for the whole sample as well as the value by the host countries included in
the sample. We can observe that, on average, market-supporting institutions have been
improved during this 18-year period. In addition, the table shows the same comparison by
focusing on emerging and advanced economies. We establish this distinction because previous
studies have mainly focused on emerging economies to analyze the effect of pro-market institu-
tions and the speed of the institutional change on firm performance (Banalieva et al., 2015;
Banalieva et al., 2018; Chari & Banalieva, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009). However, as we
can observe in the table, market-supporting institutions have increased by almost five points for
emerging and advanced economies. Although the advanced economies present stronger
market-supporting institutions (as a consequence of earlier pro-market reforms), they are also
subject to institutional changes of similar magnitude during the period of analysis. Therefore,
we believe that it is convenient to include these countries in the sample to provide more com-
plete evidence of the influence of the speed of institutional change on subsidiary performance.
If we observe the detailed comparison of values by the host country, we find that 35 of the
142 countries in the sample show weaker market-supporting institutions in 2017 than in 2000,
which indicates that 75% of countries show an increase in the level of market-supporting insti-
tutions. With regard to the countries that have weakened their market-supporting institutions,
this decrease is slight, with only a few exceptions (i.e., Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela),
where the deterioration is pronounced because of the turbulent political conditions in recent
years.
Table 2 illustrates the mean value and its SD, as well as the minimum and maximum values
of all the variables. It can be observed that, on average, the performance of the subsidiaries
included in the sample is 0.21, with a SD of 0.38, which reflects high variability. It can also be
observed that the average host institutional change speed is positive and reaches a value of
0.004. However, the speed of change that countries undergo also reveals a high level of variabil-
ity, as indicated by the SD of 0.04, as well as the maximum (0.37) and minimum (0.34) values.
Regarding the moderating variables, the home country learning, on average, shows a mean
value of 1.27 with a SD of 2.75. This presents the wide difference between its maximum
(13) and minimum (0) values. Regarding host country learning, with a mean value of 11.6 and
a SD of 14.81, the maximum value of the variable is 51, which indicates that MNEs have accu-
mulated a high level of prior experience in other host countries. When we analyze correlations
between the different variables (Table 3), there is a positive and significant correlation between































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16 FUENTELSAZ ET AL.
the subsidiary performance of the current year and the lagged performance, as well as a nega-
tive and significant correlation between the host institutional change speed and subsidiary per-
formance. The home and host countries learning present a positive correlation with subsidiary
performance. Regarding the control variables, only the country size has a relatively high corre-
lation (over 0.5) with subsidiary size. It seems reasonable that in countries with a larger popula-
tion there is scope for firms with higher size. A variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis has been
carried out to verify possible multicollinearity problems among our variables. The value
obtained, a mean VIF near to 3 and lower than 10, suggests that multicollinearity problems are
not important here (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990).
4.6 | Methods
Our dependent variable, subsidiary performance, may present inertia over time because current
values may be conditioned by the performance of prior periods (as shown in Table 3). For this
reason, we use dynamic panel data analysis to control for potential endogeneity by including a
lag of the dependent variable, subsidiary performancet  1. In this context, prior research has
shown that ordinary least squares gives an estimation of coefficients that is biased (Li, Ding,
Hu, & Wan, 2021). Similarly to other studies that have analyzed performance (Fuentelsaz,
Garrido, & Maicas, 2015b; Uotila, Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2009), we use the system generalized
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics (N = 3,963)
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Subsidiary performance 0.21 0.38 9.9 1.03
Host institutional change speedt  1 0.004 0.04 0.34 0.37
Home country learningt  1 1.27 2.75 0 13
Host countries learningt  1 11.6 14.81 0 51
Subsidiary sizet  1 9.2 18.6 0 256
Subsidiary aget  1 9.1 4.60 0 27
MNE ownership levelt  1 0.81 0.25 0.1 1
MNE size t  1 321.3 369.1 0.23 1,683
MNE age t  1 20.6 12.1 1 86
MNE experience t  1 12.01 8.75 1 36
Institutional starting pointt  1 0.51 0.49 0 1
Scope of host institutionst  1 61.3 15.9 1 92.1
Scope of home institutionst  1 70.3 14.2 39.3 92.1
Host market concentrationt  1 3,919 1,370 1,324 10,000
Home market concentrationt  1 3,451 1,156 1,332 10,000
GDPt  1 563 1,635 0.20 18,624
Technological changet  1 0.74 0.44 0 1
Demand growtht  1 0.22 0.94 0.28 53.1
Country sizet  1 16.6 1.60 11.4 21














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18 FUENTELSAZ ET AL.
method of moments (GMM) in two steps as our estimation approach (Arellano & Bover, 1995;
Blundell & Bond, 1998). The system GMM estimator produces dynamic estimates that consider
lagged realizations of the dependent variable, providing consistent results in the presence of dif-
ferent endogeneity problems (Greene, 2008). Using this method, we controlled for the three
major sources of endogeneity, namely, (a) unobserved heterogeneity, (b) simultaneity, and
(c) dynamic endogeneity (Ullah, Akhtar, & Zaefarian, 2018).
5 | RESULTS
Table 4 shows the results of the system GMM estimations. Before discussing them, we address
possible failed specifications of the models that are verified through several tests, presented at
the bottom of Table 5. First, the Hansen statistic of excessive identification restrictions is used
to prove the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term. The result of
the test is statistically nonsignificant, with levels of significance between 0.10 and 0.25
(Roodman, 2009), and, therefore, there is no overidentification (the instruments are valid). Sec-
ond, we use the statistics developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to prove that the errors are
uncorrelated. Using the Arellano–Bond family of estimators requires that the model's error
terms be not second-order correlated (as evidenced by the lack of significance for the AR[2] test).
Third, the Wald Chi tests are presented to measure the joint significance of the variables in the
models. All of the Wald tests support the joint importance of the coefficients.
As can be seen in Table 4, the results of our system GMM estimations in two steps are pro-
vided in Models 1–5. Model 1 considers the influence of the control variables in subsidiary per-
formance. Model 2 introduces the effect that host institutional change speed has on the
dependent variable to test H1. Model 3 introduces the variable home country learning and
the interaction effect with host institutional change speed that corresponds to H2. Model 4 incor-
porates the direct effect of host countries learning in subsidiary performance and the interaction
with the host institutional change speed that corresponds to H3. Finally, Model 5 introduces
both interaction effects. The F-tests are presented at the bottom of the table and show that
Model 5 is the model that best fits our data; thus, we employ it to comment on our results.
Models 1–5 show that the effect of control variables on subsidiary performance remains stable.
The performance of the previous year (subsidiary performancet  1) presents a positive and signifi-
cant effect. Host market concentration and technological change also have a positive and significant
effect, showing that in less competitive markets and in markets where technological changes take
place, the opportunities to obtain higher results increase. Contrarily, the scope of host institutions
presents a negative and significant effect. Other variables such as home market concentration, GDP,
subsidiary size, and demand growth show nonsignificant relationships.
H1 states that the host institutional change speed negatively influences the subsidiary perfor-
mance. Our results in Model 5, which are in line with the results obtained in the rest of the
models, suggest that the higher the speed of change of market-supporting institutions in
the host country, the lower the performance obtained by subsidiaries (β = .534; p = .018).
This supports H1, showing that subsidiaries tend to obtain lower performance when institu-
tional changes take place in short periods of time.
Our theoretical model has argued that not all subsidiaries adapt to institutional changes in the
same way. In H2, we postulate that subsidiaries controlled by MNEs with an origin in economies
that have experienced high-speed institutional changes are better prepared to adapt to fast pro-
market reforms and, therefore, their performance is not affected so negatively by the host




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FUENTELSAZ ET AL. 23
institutional change speed. As can be observed in Model 5 (similar to Model 3 which only included
the first moderation effect), there is a positive and significant effect for the interaction between the
host institutional change speed and the home country learning of MNEs (β = .198; p = .071). So, we
find support for H2. As expected, subsidiaries controlled by MNEs from economies previously
undergoing rapid institutional changes can adapt better to fast institutional changes because of the
institutional learning that they receive from their MNEs. As can be seen in Figure 1, the overall
negative trend is relaxed for those subsidiaries that are controlled by MNEs that present a high
level of learning from their home country (1 SD above the mean). We can see that, compared to
the subsidiaries of MNEs from home countries that have experienced slow institutional changes
(which experience a high deterioration, from 0.03 to 0.62), those controlled by MNEs originat-
ing from rapid institutional changes perform better (their performance is positively affected from
0.43 to 0.24).
The results from Model 5 also support H3. We now test the interaction between the host
institutional change speed and the host countries learning, and we find a positive and significant
relationship (β = .042; p = .012) between the two variables. This result confirms that subsidi-
aries controlled by MNEs with prior cumulative learning in other host environments undergo-
ing fast institutional changes enjoy institutional advantages compared to other subsidiaries. A
graphical illustration of this result is provided in Figure 2. As the figure reveals, although the
overall trend is negative, subsidiaries controlled by MNEs with learning in prior host countries
benefit more from rapid institutional changes compared to the remaining subsidiaries. Subsidi-
aries whose parent firms do not have cumulative experience in rapid institutional changes in
FIGURE 1 Moderating effect that the MNE's learning from home country has in the relationship between
the subsidiary's performance and the speed of institutional change in host countries
FIGURE 2 Moderating effect that the MNEs’ learning from prior host countries has in the relationship
between the subsidiary's performance and the speed of institutional change in host countries
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other host countries (1 SD below the average) will show a higher deterioration in their perfor-
mance when the institutional changes happen over a short period of time.
5.1 | Robustness analysis
To verify the consistency of our results, we have conducted the additional analysis. Given that
the level of control MNEs hold over subsidiaries may influence the knowledge transfer between
subsidiaries and the parent company, we have replicated our main analysis taking different
levels of ownership. As Table 5 reflects,9 when the control level that MNEs have over the sub-
sidiaries is 25%, our results remain stable, in line with the results previously obtained with a
10% ownership level (main analysis). H1, H2, and H3 are verified. Similarly, even if we are
more restrictive and consider that the knowledge transfer only happens when the control is
over 50%, our results also remain stable and our hypotheses are supported. Consequently, we
have corroborated that, although the knowledge transfer may increase the greater the control
held by the MNEs, the institutional competitive advantages generated by learning in the home
country and in other host countries benefit the subsidiaries regardless of the level of control
that the MNEs have over them, giving consistency to our results.
6 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This research advances in the incipient study of institutional dynamism. Specifically, it analyzes
the influence of the speed of change of pro-market institutions in the performance of the sub-
sidiary and the moderating effect of institutional advantages that subsidiaries can exploit as a
consequence of the home country and host country learning. Drawing on the dynamic
institution-based view, we argue that, when institutional changes take place in a short period of
time, the level of competition suddenly increases, as well as the need to generate new capabili-
ties to cope with the new institutional landscape. The quick increase in competition usually
goes hand in hand with the introduction of new products and technologies, and a possible
decrease in the market share of the established subsidiary, with the subsequent deterioration in
its performance. Moreover, the reorganization and new allocation of resources that are needed
to generate the required skills to adapt to the new competitive landscape will damage perfor-
mance. Our results confirm that subsidiaries obtain worse performance the higher the speed of
change in pro-market institutions.
Nevertheless, subsidiaries may have developed institutional advantages that allow them to
better adapt to the new competitive landscape because of learning undergone by MNEs in other
environments. Our results determine that not all subsidiaries adapt to changes that take place
in short periods of time equally. Subsidiaries can benefit from the institutional learning that the
parent MNEs have obtained in their home countries, in addition to in other host countries in
which they were present. By integrating the dynamic institution-based view and the organiza-
tion learning literatures, our study demonstrates that subsidiaries controlled by MNEs that have
experienced fast institutional changes in their home and other host countries will be more capa-
ble of coping with fast institutional changes in the host country. Consequently, the negative
effect of fast pro-market institutional changes on performance is weakened as a consequence of
institutional learning, which may generate a competitive advantage for these subsidiaries
(Martin, 2014). It is crucial to point out that experience in the home country is not the only
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source of such advantages: subsidiaries controlled by MNEs that have accumulated experience
in other countries undergoing rapid institutional changes can benefit from and better adapt to
the competitive pressures and the new regulations that duly arise from fast pro-market reforms
in the host country. The negative effect of fast institutional changes on subsidiary performance
is weakened because of this prior learning. Subsequently, although high-speed institutional
change usually reduces value creation, some firms better counteract this threat thanks to the
skills and capabilities built up by their parent MNEs in their home and host countries. Subsidi-
aries will react more accurately to sudden changes in the “rules of the game” that pro-market
reforms imply, such as increases in the number of competitors, changes in consumer prefer-
ences, reduction of government interventionism, or improvement of property right protection,
among others.
From a theoretical point of view, the main contribution of this research is the integration of
organizational learning and the institutional dynamism literatures on the study of the subsidi-
ary performance. We respond to the call to more deeply examine the relationship between insti-
tutional changes and firm performance by considering learning from host and home countries
(Cuervo-Cazurra, Gaur, & Singh, 2019). We incorporate the organizational learning literature
on the dynamic institution-based view by moving the focus from the institutional differences
between the home and host countries (as a key obstacle to transfer experience from one country
to another) to the experiential learning of fast institutional changes, which constitutes a key
resource to build adaptation capabilities that diminish the negative impact of rapid institutional
changes. We differentiate between the learning that comes from the home and host countries,
since prior literature has considered them to be two different sources of experience that condi-
tion the internationalization process and outcomes (Zhou & Guillén, 2015). The home and host
country learning generate institutional advantages to MNEs that can be transferred and, there-
fore, enjoyed by subsidiaries in host countries that face subsequent rapid institutional changes.
Our study has important implications from a public and a managerial point of view. Gov-
ernments, regardless of their current scope of pro-market institutions, must consider the nega-
tive influence that rapid changes in pro-market institutions have in the performance of
subsidiaries. A slower change in the institutions will allow for better adaptation and building
capabilities by subsidiaries and, therefore, their performance would not be harmed. As a conse-
quence, the institutional environment for foreign investors will be more attractive. From a man-
agerial perspective, we should distinguish between managers of domestic firms confronting
rapid institutional changes in their home countries and managers of subsidiaries and MNEs
seeking growth into new markets. For the former, they are forced to quickly develop the neces-
sary competencies to remain competitive and stay in the market. This is not an easy task and
often may involve attracting foreign partners with experience facing rapid institutional changes
in their home and host countries. Regarding the latter, managers of MNEs that have experi-
enced previous rapid changes in other countries may be in an advantageous position when it
comes to accessing new markets that are experiencing quick institutional changes. And, there-
fore, these target markets will be especially attractive for them. For instance, in its first interna-
tionalization stages, Telia Group learned from experiencing rapid institutional changes in the
late 1990s and early 2000s in its home country, Sweden, as well as in other host countries, such
as Finland, Denmark, and Estonia. This institutional learning allowed it to successfully enter
later in Latvia and Lithuania, countries that were experiencing a similar pace of change. As the
company has been conscious from its origins of the importance of dealing with rapid institu-
tional changes, it considers that one of its key activities is “continuously exploring options to
mitigate increased costs and loss of revenues due to regulatory changes” (Telia Annual and
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Sustainability Report 2018, Telia Group, 2019). Moreover, managers of subsidiaries who have
experience in dealing with rapid institutional changes become key actors within MNEs because
they can store knowledge and transfer it to their global operations. They have learned to cope
with a rapid increase in competition, demand, and innovation; their knowledge should, there-
fore, be disseminated across the MNEs' subsidiaries. To motivate managers and improve their
ability to transfer knowledge about how to deal with rapid pro-market reforms, MNEs should
invest in training courses, improve internal communication channels, and provide
performance-based compensation, among other policies (Minbaeva, Pedersen, Björkman,
Fey, & Park, 2003).
Our study is not without limitations that open new research avenues. First, it is true that
our empirical setting (the mobile telecommunications industry) has previously been used in
prior studies on institutions and organizational learning (e.g., Perkins, 2014). This industry has
been subject to deregulation and liberalization while pro-market institutions have taken place,
which may influence our results. Accordingly, it would be of interest to complement our
research analyzing other unregulated industries. Second, we have considered MNE experience
to be derived from home and host country learning. However, this may not be the only source
of experience that can benefit subsidiaries when rapid institutional change takes place. For
example, it is possible that previous subsidiaries' experience in the case of being previously con-
trolled by other MNEs can also benefit them, thus, further studies would be welcome regarding
this issue. Finally, the effective knowledge transfer from the parent company to subsidiaries can
depend on the mechanism that has been used in their international expansion (e.g., greenfield
or acquisition). For this reason, it would be interesting to analyze to what extent the institu-
tional advantage of subsidiaries to counteract rapid institutional changes can depend on the
entry mode that their multinationals have selected.
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1 In this article, we indistinguishably use “institutional changes” and “pro-market reforms” to refer to variations
in the level of development of market-supporting institutions that lead to national governance improvements
and economic liberalization.
2 Our database includes all subsidiaries from the data set with available data that have been controlled by MNEs
with at least 10% ownership in each period. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for
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Economic Cooperation and Development have considered the existence of FDI when MNEs own at least 10%
of the subsidiary's equity.
3 See Tables A1 and 1 for a detailed list of the home (Table A1) and host countries (Table 1) included in the sam-
ple, respectively.
4 We limit the extreme values to reduce the effect of possible outliers (Barnett & Lewis, 1994). Only four observa-
tions are lost in this step.
5 There are countries included in the sample for which the Economic Freedom Index does not report data until
2004 or 2009, so we have taken those years as the base years for these exceptions. In the rest of the cases, 2000
is the base year.
6 For example, to calculate the Actual Speed of Institutional Change in Austria in 2007, we take the scope of
market-supporting institutions during 2007, which reports a value of 79.66. We subtract from this value the
scope of market-supporting institutions for the base year, in our case the year 2000, which takes a value of
76.6. Finally, we divide this difference (3.06) between the years that have elapsed since the base year and the
year that is being calculated (7). Therefore, the actual speed of institutional change in 2007 is 0.437.
7 Connections refer to the number of SIM cards (or phone numbers, where SIM cards are not used), excluding
cellular M2M, that have been registered on the mobile network at the end of the period (GSMA
Intelligence, 2018).
8 According to the Heritage Foundation, a country is free, mostly free or moderately free if its Economic Free-
dom Index is above 60. On the contrary, a country is repressed or mostly unfree if the index for this country is
below 60.
9 All the models included in the table have incorporated the same control variables as the main analysis. Fur-
thermore, all the criteria and tests that are necessary for the correct specifications of GMM system are fulfilled
and have been incorporated.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 Home countries included in the empirical analysis
Home countries (44)
Advanced Emerging
Australia Japan Argentina Malaysia
Austria Luxemburg Bahrein Mexico
Belgium Netherlands Brazil Morocco
Czech Republic Norway Chile Qatar
Denmark Portugal Croatia Russian Federation
Finland Singapore Egypt Saudi Arabia
France Slovenia Fiji Senegal
Germany Spain Hungary Serbia
Greece Sweden India South Africa
Hong Kong USA Jamaica Turkey
Italy United Kingdom Kuwait United Arab Emirates
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